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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
PlaintiflTRespondent / 
/ Court of Appeals No. 
vs. / 990327-CA 
/ Priority No. 
ENRIQUE CORIA JR., / 
Defendant/Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(4). Defendant's appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(i) who thereafter transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower Court commit error in excusing two separate jurors for cause over the 
objection of Defendant. 
The Standard of Review, In reviewing a Defendant's right to an impartial jury the 
standard in reviewing the lower Court's ruling is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion 
in dismissing a prospective juror. State v. Woollev. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Baker. 
884 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court and such objection appears at Volume II, TR 279-
1 
280. 
2. Did the lower court commit error in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
based upon the unlawful seizure and detention of Defendant and the evidence ultimately seized and 
the resulting statement of the Defendant. 
The Standard of Review. In reviewing the factual findings of the trial court underlying 
its decision to grant or deny a Motion to Suppress, the Appellate Court will not disturb such factual 
findings on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Smith. 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989). 
The standard of review for the trial courts conclusions of law is under the correctness standard. 
State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah, 1994). 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress (R. 130-137) and an Evidentiary Hearing was 
conducted on August 18,1998 wherein the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 171). 
3. Did the lower court commit error in denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
alternatives (a) and (b) of the Amended Information charging the Defendant with Murder in the 
Second Degree at the Conclusion of the State's case. 
The Standard of Review. In reviewing a trial courts ruling on a Motion to Dismiss such 
Motion being a question of law, the Appellate Court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness 
with no particular deference to its legal conclusions. State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 
1992); State v.Richardson. 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992). 
The Defendant motioned for dismissal of all three alternatives to the Murder information at 
the conclusion at the states evidence and particularly motioning to dismiss alternative (a) and (b) 
asserting there was insufficient evidence to justify proceeding under those alternatives. (Vol II TR 
2 
284). 
4. Did the lower court commit error in its supplemental instruction to the jury and 
whether or not it was a proper statement of law. 
The Standard of Review, Determining the propriety of jury instructions presents a 
question of law which is reviewed under a correction of error standard affording no deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. State v. Clements, 967 P.2d 957 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Lucero. 
866 P.2dl (Utah App. 1993). 
The Defendant upon learning of the jury question and court's instruction after the jury had 
been excused objected to the instruction and requested to make a record of its initial objection at that 
time which the court permitted. (Vol IV TR 72-76). 
5. Did the lower court commit error in not granting the Defendant a new trial based 
upon the supplemental instruction given to the jury in answer to the jury question. 
The Standard of Review. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial, it is 
revealable under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah, 1992). 
The Defendant after sentencing filed its Motion for a New Trial with said new trial motion 
being ultimately denied by the Court's written ruling on March 3,1999. (R. 335-339). 
6. Whether or not the evidence presented was sufficient to justify a conviction of the 
Defendant of Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony. 
The Standard of Review. When reviewing the sufficiency evidence supporting a 
conviction the Appellate Court will overturn a jury verdict "only when the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached a verdict based upon a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah, 1987); State v. Isacson, 704 P.2d 555 (Utah, 1985). 
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Sufficiency of the evidence is a ground for seeking review which does not require a specific 
objection during the trial but was set forth as an issue presented for appeal in the Defendant's 
docketing statement. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules which are determinative of the issues 
presented in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty of Murder, a First Degree Felony in the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah on the 2nd day of October, 1998 with 
the Honorable Roger S. Dutson, District Court Judge presiding and also an appeal from the rulings 
by the District Court Judge denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial subsequent to the jury 
verdict rendered on October 2, 1998. 
The Defendant after being sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of not less than five 
(5) years which could be for life and with a gun enhancement penalty attached therewith 
subsequently denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on the 3rd day of March, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, Enrique Coria was charged with Murder a First Degree Felony in violation 
of U.C A. 76-5-203 by amended information. (R.24). Said amended information alleges Murder in 
three different alternatives pursuant to U.C.A. 76-5-203 (a)(b) and (c). 
The Defendant, prior to trial filed a Motion to Suppress certain evidence relating to a 
detention and seizure that occurred on January 23, 1998. (R. 130-137). Said Suppression Hearing 
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came on regularly for hearing on the 18th day of August, 1998 wherein evidence was adduced and 
testimony taken resulting in the Court denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 171). 
The Defendant was stopped on January 23, 1998 at approximately 2257 hours by Officer 
Mills of the Ogden Police Department for accelerating his vehicle with spinning tires. (Suppression 
TR21). 
Officer Mills approached the vehicle and the driver, Enrique Coria Jr., stated, "I have guns 
in the truck." (Suppression TR 8). 
That Officer Mills pulled his gun and ordered the Defendant and his passenger from the 
vehicle and retrieved the firearms from the vehicle. (Suppression TR 9,11). 
That the guns were unloaded and the magazines and ammunition were in the glove box. 
(Suppression TR 13, 14,15). 
That Officer Mills asked the Defendant and his passenger to step out of the vehicle and both 
parties exited the vehicle and went to the rear of the truck with Reserve Officer Osterhout. 
(Suppression TR 9, 11). 
Officer Mills retrieved the firearms from the vehicle and let both the Defendant and his 
passenger back into the vehicle. (Suppression TR 13). 
Then the Defendant handed Officer Mills his drivers license and registration. (Suppression 
TR11). 
Then Officer Mills returned to his vehicle and called for a gang officer to respond because 
of the firearms. (Suppression TR 12, 32). 
The Officer determined that the firearms were not loaded and that it was not unlawful to 
have the firearms in the vehicle. (TR 26,13, 14). 
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It was Officer Mills traffic stop was complete by 11:25 pm. 
At 11:25 pm Officer Mills role in the traffic stop was complete and his purpose for 
remaining at the scene was to sit in the car and watch the Defendant's truck. (Suppression TR 17, 
36,37). 
That the Defendant was at the scene from 10:57 pm until 12:30 am. That at approximately 
12:30 am the Defendant was taken to the police department for questioning by Officer Ledford and 
held at the station and questioned until 2:36 am. (Suppression TR 41, 53). 
This matter then came on regularly for trial by jury on the 29th day of September, 1998 and 
continued through October 2,1998 whereupon the Defendant was found guilty of Murder, a First 
Degree Felony by jury verdict. (R.224). 
During the course of voir doir examination the Court on its own Motion excused from the 
panel two individuals which the Defendant objected to being dismissed for cause. (Vol II. 279-280). 
The first juror, Kelly Gorder, was excused for cause by the Court with the Court finding that 
he had an existing attorney/client privilege with an attorney in the office of the defense attorneys. 
(R.280). This dismissal occurred despite Mr. Gorder's statement that he was not acquainted with 
defense counsel and that their associate attorney Steven Farr was not representing him on anything 
at the time of the trial. (Voir Doir 62). 
Mrs. Couch was also excused as a juror by the Court for cause over the objection of 
Defendant (Vol II. 280-281) because of a rodeo event involving her daughter and two other girls 
which she would be driving to Salina later in the week. (Voir Doir 51, 74-77). 
After impaneling the jury three individuals, Freddy Silva, Nanyow Silva and Claude James 
Carroll testified as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident of January 10, 1998 
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which resulted in the death of Ivan Moreno. 
Freddy Silva along with five of his relatives including the decedent, Ivan Moreno, left Logan 
and drove to Ogden on Saturday, January 10, 1998 arriving in Ogden around 10:00 or 10:30 pm. 
(Vol ITR. 48). Sometime later, Freddy Silva drove his red Astro van to Kicks 66, a convenience 
gas-mart, on Washington Boulevard for the purpose of using the restroom and when pulling into the 
Kicks 66 almost collided with a truck (which was ultimately discovered to have been) being driven 
by the Defendant. (Vol I TR 53-54). While some of the individuals in Silva's van went to use the 
bathroom, Hubert Moreno, one of the relatives in the van went toward the Defendant's truck yelling 
at Defendant and his passenger Carroll. (Vol I TR 55). 
Nanyow Silva, another passenger/relative in the van testified that Hubert Moreno as the truck 
was leaving was walking fast at the truck and was by the road where the truck was leaving and that 
Freddy Silva was running towards them after he heard what he thought might be gunshots (Vol II 
TR 30,32). Nanyow Silva also admitting walking towards Hubert Moreno and Freddy Silva as they 
were walking toward Defendant's truck and started running towards them after he heard shot(s) as 
they all ran near the corner of the parking lot area. (Vol II TR 32). 
After staying at the Kicks 66 gas-mart approximately five (5) minutes everyone got back in 
the van Freddy Silva was driving and they left the area in the same direction in which the Defendant's 
vehicle had left the area five minutes earlier. (Vol II TR 34; Vol I TR 62). 
Freddy Silva next testified he didn't see Defendant's truck again until he was in the area of the 
Ogden City Mall going northbound on Washington Boulevard when he observed the Defendant's 
truck behind him. He further testified that after a few blocks he turned off of Washington to see if the 
Defendant's truck was following them, which he claimed continued following them at that time. (Vol 
7 
I TR 64-66). 
Further, Silva testified he was being chased on little streets turning approximately three (3) 
times until he ended up on a big street and that the Defendant's vehicle pulled along side of his van 
at a high rate of speed and then turned right onto another street where the driver got out of his vehicle 
and started shooting at his van. (Vol I TR 67,72). Freddy Silva then testified that after leaving the area 
where the shots were fired he discovered that Ivan Mareno was hit by a bullet and they proceeded to 
a police station for help.(Vol I TR 74). The decedent Ivan Moreno subsequently died from said 
gunshot wound. 
All of the other five (5) individuals in the van were all questioned separately at the police 
station and every one of them lied to the police and that it was at Freddy Silva's order that he told the 
others not to say anything to the police. (Vol I TR 80,82). The police then re-interviewed separately 
Freddy Silva, in Logan with his probation officer present and Nanyow Silva in Logan on January 14, 
1998 (after they had spent considerable time with one another and were told of details similar to their 
testimony. (Vol I TR 83). 
Despite claiming at trial to be telling the truth, Freddy Silva denies knowing what was said by 
Hubert Moreno as he was yelling at the truck at Kicks 66 on the night of this incident. The passengers 
from the van also admitted to the police officers they had been in the area where the incident had 
occurred "looking for casings" before the January 14, 1998 interview but denied they had a gun on 
the evening of this incident or were looking for a gun. (Vol I TR 109). 
Freddy Silva also denied at trial telling Officer Ledford that the truck began following them 
shortly after they turned onto Grant Avenue resulting in the ultimate chase onto Wall Avenue during 
the interview of January 14,1998. (Vol I TR 113). Both Freddy and Nanyow Silva, decedent's 
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relatives, deny they were ever chasing the Defendant's truck. (Vol ITR 125). 
The State also called John Gerrard, a habitual felon who testified he has been in and out of 
prison for the last twenty (20) years, claiming the Defendant told him while they were in jail together 
for a short period of time, that Defendant told him when he pulled into the gas station and ran into 
other "gang members" the Defendant wanted to collect for advancing drugs to them but because there 
were too many of them at that time, they left the area but waited for "him" so they could collect and 
when they saw them again they chased one another around town ultimately resulting in the Defendant 
shooting at the van. (Vol II TR 176-177,186). 
On the night of the incident the police secured Gun Shot Residue samples from the hands of 
all individuals in the van as well as samples inside Silva's van and the samples were then sent to the 
State Crime Lab for analysis. (Vol HI TR 4). The State and Defendant further stipulated at trial that 
the gun shot residue test performed which was done on each of the individuals in the van and on 
interior portions of the van as well as the Defendant's truck were the samples tested by the Crime Lab. 
(VoimTR5). 
David Wakefield of the State Crime Lab testified gunshot residue was found (absolutely) on 
the stub marked top back bench of the van. (Vol in TR 23). He further testified that with respect to 
Freddy Silva, the driver of the van there was one particle characteristic on the GSR test stub 
designated right back of his hand and there were seven particles characteristic on the GSR test stub 
designated left back of his hand in his testing for gunshot residue. (Vol III TR 24). 
Mr. Wakefield, in addition to saying there was absolutely no doubt in his mind gunshot 
residue was found in the van, testified it could have gotten there either by a gun that was fired very 
close to that area, or a gun that had been fired came in contact with that area, or an object such as a 
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hand or something that had fired a gun or handled a fired gun touched that area. (Vol HI TR 35). 
Wakefield in his testimony also testified that the State Crime Lab was no longer doing gun shot 
residue (GSR) testing with the electron microscope they had used in this Defendant's case in that there 
were problems with sensitivity in that the GSR results were resulting in a false negative meaning there 
were cases where the microscope was not sensitive enough to pick up particles of gunshot residue. 
(Vol III TR 13-14). He indicated that such false negatives or insensitivity were occurring during the 
time period in which the GSR testing was done of the individuals in the van and the van itself (Vol 
IITR14). 
In addition to calling David Wakefield as a witness, the Defendant also called James Gaskill 
as an expert witness in the area of gunshot residue. Mr. Gaskill indicated he had started the Crime lab 
at Weber State University in 1972 and that it had for many years under his direction served as the 
State Crime Lab. (Vol III TR 18). 
Mr. Gaskill testified it was his opinion that "it is very likely that a firearm was discharged in 
that vehicle" referring to the Freddy Silva van. (Vol in TR 50). He further testified that it was more 
likely to have been recent than distant but that he could not clearly set forth a time frame. (Vol in TR 
50). 
The State also elected not to call Claude James Carroll as a witness despite being under 
subpoena by the State and despite him having met with the police and prosecutors on multiple 
occasions. (Vol ffl TR 61). 
Mr. Carroll testified that he and the Defendant with whom he was riding on the evening of 
this incident left the Kicks 66 gas-mart after individuals in the van were cussing at them, throwing up 
gang signs and then started running after them. (Vol IH TR 62,64) 
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As the Defendant and Carroll were leaving and some individuals in the van were coming after 
them, Carroll noticed something shiny which he thought might be a gun and after telling this to the 
Defendant put his head down. (Vol IE TR 66). While his head was down he thought the Defendant 
fired a gun out the back window of the truck. (Vol HI TR 66). Carroll further testified after leaving 
the area they pulled to the side of the road and the Defendant attempted to call someone on his cell 
phone and that as they started back up the van pulled behind them. (Vol III TR 66-67). 
Carroll then testified the van kept getting closer and closer and that they were throwing stuff 
so Defendant started "flying through the streets" to get away from the van.( Vol III TR 67). Carroll 
testified the van continued to chase them onto Wall Avenue and because the van was still right behind 
them, the Defendant pulled his truck over onto 22nd Street and as he did so the van kinda pulled off 
of Wall Avenue and parked right there, contrary to the testimony of Silva that they never stopped. (Vol 
in TR 70, 72). 
Carroll further indicated that after Defendant stopped the truck, he was pretty much scared 
and didn't know what to expect from the van and was putting his head between his knees. (Vol in TR 
74). As the Defendant jumped out of the van he heard a number of shots and that after the shots were 
fired he then looked up, seeing the van turning as it was leaving the area. (Vol III TR 75). The 
Defendant was very nervous and sweating very badly at that time and looked like he was just about 
as scared as he looked. (Vol III TR 76). 
Carroll and the Defendant both learned for the first time that someone had been hurt when they 
were stopped for a traffic offense on January 23,1999, the night Defendant was arrested and his truck 
impounded. (Vol HI TR 77). 
Carroll was with the Defendant when they were stopped for a traffic offense which resulted 
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in a detention, seizure and ultimate statement by the Defendant Enrique Coria which the Defendant 
motioned to suppress and contends was violative of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (R. 
130-137). 
Although the Defendant did not testify during his trial the statement obtained from him on the 
night of January 23, 1998 was received in evidence. (Trial Court Exhibit 34). Officer Ledford, the 
primary investigating officer, of the Ogden Police Department testified relative to his interrogation of 
the Defendant and the statement which was reduced to writing after such interrogation on the night 
of January 23,1998 and that Defendant's statement did not include all things the Defendant told him 
leading up to preparing a written statement. Officer Ledford admitted in his testimony that the 
Defendant told him he thought they had a gun on the night of this incident. (Vol IITR 227). 
Further testimony from Officer Ledford included statements by the Defendant that he was 
scared of the people in the van and if they caught up to him they probably would have beaten him up 
and that he started shooting at the van because he was scared. (Vol II TR 25). 
In further recounting the Defendant's statement, Officer Ledford testified when he asked the 
Defendant, when you were shooting at the van did you think someone might get shot, the Defendant 
responded "I didn't mean to do it". (Vol II TR 252). 
Throughout the testimony of Claude James Carroll, the statement given the police by the 
Defendant, and the testimony of Officer Ledford of Defendant's statements to him, such testimony 
consistently declared that the van was chasing the Defendant's truck at all times. (Vol IITR252); (Vol 
ffl TR 78). 
The Defendant at the conclusion of the State's presentation of evidence motioned the Court 
to dismiss the charges against the Defendant under all three theories but at the very least submitted 
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to the Court that the State had not shown sufficient evidence to justify proceeding under alternatives 
one and two of the amended information. (Vol n TR 284). Such motion was denied by the Court. (Vol 
HTR287). 
Upon both sides resting their case and making closing arguments the matter was submitted 
to the jury for decision and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of Second Degree Murder a First 
Degree Felony. 
After the jury was excused, the Court advised the parties that it had received a communication 
from the jury and that it had responded to the jury in writing giving a copy of the question and the 
Court's response to the parties. (Vol IV TR 71). The Defendant thereupon requested and made a 
record contending that the Court instruction was erroneous and should not have been given in such 
form. (Vol IV TR 73-74). The actual jury question and the Court's response appears in the Record at 
pages 230 and 231. (R. 230,231). 
The Defendant was subsequently sentenced by the Court to a term in the Utah State Prison of 
not less than 5 years which may be for life plus the weapon enhancement penalty. (R.312-314). After 
being sentenced, the Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial supported by Memorandum contending 
the trial judge's supplemental instruction to the jury was an incorrect and misleading statement of law 
which had a substantial adverse affect upon the Defendant's rights. (R.316-320). The Court after 
hearing on February 10,1999 issued its ruling on the 3rd day of March, 1999 denying Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial.(R.328-332). The Defendant thereafter filed its Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(i) who transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(4). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant, Enrique Coria, asserts the seizure of his guns as well as his detention and 
subsequent statement were violative of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
The Defendant also asserts not dismissing the first two alternatives of the amended information 
charging the Defendant with Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony should have been 
granted and the Court's failure to do so resulted in an unacceptable confusion to the jury. 
The Defendant further asserts and contends that the Supplemental Jury Instruction was both 
confusing and if not an incorrect statement of the law so misleading that the jury was confused and/or 
misled resulting in Defendant's conviction of Murder in the Second Degree. 
Finally, Defendant asserts because of the confusion generated by the Court's supplemental 
instruction, the confusion relating to elements of the offense and the undue weight lesser resulting 
from such instruction as well as all the other trial court errors including the refusal to dismiss the first 
two alterations of the Amended Murder information all constitute error and such errors are not 
harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN EXCUSING TWO 
SEPARATE JURORS FOR CAUSE OVER THE OBJECTION OF 
DEFENDANT. 
The action of the Court in dismissing two jurors for cause when in fact no basis for excusing 
them for cause existed affected the Defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed in 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
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The Court on its own Motion excused juror, Kelly Gorder after juror Gorder had indicated he 
knew Officer Scott Conley and attorney Steven Fair. Juror Gorder during Voir Dire indicated that in 
addition to knowing quite a few Weber County Officers also indicated he knew Steven Farr but that 
he had never talked about any cases with him. He also indicated that Steven Farr was not representing 
him on anything at this time and specifically indicated that he could be an impartial juror. (Voir Dire 
63). 
Rule 18 (e) sets forth the basis upon which challenges for cause may be taken and Rule 18 
(e)(4) indicates it could be taken when the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary, or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant which relationship when viewed objectively would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which 
would be free of favoritism. 
The record shows to the contrary and illustrates that the juror Gorder knew both police officers 
and an attorney who is associated with the attorney's representing the Defendant. He was not excused 
because he couldn't be fair for he specifically indicated he thought he could be fair. 
The Court also excused for cause juror Couch for cause despite the fact that there was no basis 
pursuant to excuse her for cause under URCrP 18. The Court indicated that it dismissed her in the 
following statement: 
"And the Court did find that although it was a fairly close issue, that it would have 
been so distracting to her in the court's opinion in observing her in responses and the 
impact of her being required to remain here for jury duty with this long term 
commitment and there being adequate other persons on the panel that we were able 
to get a jury, it appeared to the Court that it would be proper to excuse her for cause." 
The Utah Appellate Court has consistently granted the trial court a wide range of discretion 
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in determining whether to grant challenges for cause. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah, 1993). It 
has been held that if in the sound exercise of discretion requires a juror to be excused for cause, a 
court permits prejudicial error when it forces a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to have that 
juror removed. State v. Suarez. 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990). 
In State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1994) the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that 
the Appellant was misconstruing the meaning of the term "incompetent" where the Defendant' s argue 
it was based on the fact that a prospective juror had a scheduling conflict regarding his wife's need 
for physical therapy and that this scheduling conflict according to the Defendant diverted Barber's fixll 
attention from the trial and therefore rendered him incompetent. 
Not only did the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Brooks, cited supra, determine that was a 
misconstruction of the term "incompetent" but ruled that absent bias or incompetence the trial court 
did not commit plain error in leaving said juror on the panel. 
The instant proceeding involved a different situation wherein the trial court removed two 
prospective jurors for cause when in fact challenges for cause were not justified. 
U.C.A. 78-46-2 declares it is the policy of the state that jurors be selected from a fair cross-
section of the population requiring that all qualified citizens be considered for service and have the 
obligation to serve when summoned for that purpose. 
Defendant asserts when the trial judge removes two jurors for cause when cause does not exist 
entire dynamics for the jury are altered as a jury. 
In this particular instance a list of 29 jurors was prepared from which a jury panel of 25 
individuals was sworn and questioned during Voir Dire. 
The Defendant believes and contends by excusing juror Gorder and juror Couch for cause who 
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were in seats 3 and 4 had the direct effect of leading to the inclusion of juror number 7 (Sky) and juror 
number 8 (Thompson). Obviously, the Defendant could have excused jurors numbers 7 and 8 with 
two of his peremptory challenges but in so doing would not have been able to have removed two of 
the jurors that were in fact removed. 
Consequently, the entire dynamic and domino effect in selecting a fair cross section was 
altered by the trial court excusing for cause two jurors that should not have been excused for cause. 
While Defendant concedes he cannot specifically declare a different verdict would have been reached 
with a different jury panel it also cannot be said that the same verdict would have been reached. 
Therefore, such abuse of discretion by the trial court in changing the composition and 
character of the jury should not be declared harmless error for jury rights are the most basic and 
important rights afforded to all Defendants and Defendant's rights were in fact affected by the errors 
of the trial court. 
Point n 
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BASED UPON THE UNLAWFUL 
SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF DEFENDANT AND THE EVIDENCE 
ULTIMATELY SEIZED AS WELL AS THE RESULTING STATEMENT OF 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT 
The Defendant was stopped on January 23,1998 at approximately 10:57 pm by Officer Mills 
of the Ogden Police Department for accelerating his vehicle with spinning tires. As Officer Mills 
approached the vehicle and the driver, Enrique Coria Jr., Mr. Coria stated, "I have guns in the 
truck." 
Officer Mills ordered the Defendant and his passenger to step out of the vehicle and both 
parties exited the vehicle and went to the rear of the truck with Reserve Officer Osterhout. Officer 
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Mills then retrieved the firearms from the vehicle and let both the Defendant and his passenger back 
into the vehicle. The Defendant then handed Officer Mills his drivers license and registration. 
Officer Mills traffic stop was completed at 11:25 pm although the Defendant was held at the scene 
until 12:30 am. At approximately 12:30 am the Defendant was taken to the police department for 
questioning by Officer Ledford and held at the station and questioned until 2:36 am at which time 
the Defendant gave a written statement confessing to the homicide. 
To determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable, there is dual 
inquiry:(l) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception and; (2) Was the resulting 
detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justified the interference in the first 
place. State v. Shepherd. 955 P.2d 253 (Utah App. 1998), State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 
(Utah, 1994) Quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 US 1, 9, (1968). 
Defendant concedes that the officer was justified in making the initial stop because he 
observed the car spinning tires as he accelerated through the intersection. He argued however, that 
the officers exceeded the proper scope of the traffic stop when they detained the Defendant for over 
an hour after the initial traffic stop was complete. 
The officer's action in detaining Mr. Coria for an hour and a half for a simple traffic stop 
violates Mr. Coria's right to be free from unlawful search and seizure under both the Utah and the 
United States Constitutions. 
After an officer stops a vehicle, "the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1132 (quoting Florida v. 
Rover, 460 US 491,500 (1983)). Accordingly, an officer who stops a vehicle for a traffic violation 
may ask for a drivers license and vehicle registration and may run a computer check on that 
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information. After the driver provides proper drivers license and evidence of entitlement to the use 
of the vehicle, the driver can no longer be detained. Any further detention for investigative 
questioning must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. The 
reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop. Even if the officers reasonable suspicion 
supports further detention, the scope of the stop is still limited. The officer must diligently pursue 
a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. State v. Grovien 
808 R2d 133,136 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the present case, the Defendant was detained at the scene for over an hour and a half for 
a simple traffic citation. Officer Mills seized the Defendant's firearm and had the opportunity to 
check the firearms to see if they were loaded. Officer Mills has no facts upon which a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity could arise and in fact stated that he intended to return the Defendant's 
guns to him upon completion of the traffic citation. The seizure of the firearms was prior to the State 
obtaining a warrant. The State argues that the seizure of the firearms is valid under the plain view 
doctrine. A seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present, (2) 
the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating. State v. Keitz. 856 P.2d 685,690 
(Utah App. 1993). For an object in plain view to be clearly incriminating, there must be probable 
cause to associate the property with criminal activity. State v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385, 390 (Utah, 
1986). Probable cause requires only that a police officer reasonably believe that certain items may 
be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing 
that such belief be correct. In the present case, Officer Mills was totally lacking in probable cause 
to believe that the firearms he seized were evidence of a crime. In fact, the officer indicates he 
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realized it was legal for the Defendant's to possess the firearms in their vehicle and that he intended 
to return the Defendant's guns to him upon completion of the traffic citation. 
The test for when a seizure of the Defendant occurred is objective and depends on "when 
the person reasonably feels detained, not when the police officer thinks the person is no longer free 
to leave." State v. Ramirez. 817 R2d 774, 786 (Utah, 1991). In State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655 
(Utah App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals held that once the occupants of the vehicle had 
satisfied the reasons for the initial stop the officer must permit them to proceed and that any further 
temporary detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose of the initial 
stop is justified only if the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Investigative questions that further detain the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of 
more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means a suspicion based on specific, 
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the 
stop. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah, 1994). In the present case, the officers did not have 
specific articulable facts upon which a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity could arise. 
The officer seized the property of the Defendant, his firearms and truck, and further detained the 
Defendant for investigative questioning for approximately three (3) hours after the initial traffic 
stop. 
Assuming, that the detention of the Defendant and the seizure of the Defendant's personal 
property was illegal or at least accompanied by police misconduct, the Court must decide whether 
the Defendant's statement were sufficiently attenuated from the alleged misconduct to remove any 
taint. The Defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and made incriminating statements. In 
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990), the Utah Supreme Court reversing the Court of Appeals 
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holding in State v. Arrovo. 770 P.2d 153,155-56 (Utah App. 1989), held that to be constitutionally 
valid, a search consent following illegal police behavior must be both non coerced and not arrived 
at by exploitation of the primary police illegality. The fact used to evaluate the non exploitation or 
attenuation element are derived from Brown v. Illinois. 422 US 590 (1975), which involved a 
confession obtained from a criminal suspect after his illegal arrest. The factors include the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of consent, the presence or absence of 
intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. The purpose 
of an attenuation analysis is found in the basic truth that the government must use lawful means to 
achieve its objectives. This includes not seizing the Defendant to unearth wrongdoing except under 
well defined circumstances. The incentive for engaging in unconstitutional conduct generally can 
be removed by excluding the evidence obtained from the illegal seizures. In Arroyo, the Court 
rejected the position that voluntary consent, by itself, is an intervening act free of exploitation 
because "police should not be permitted to ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a 
consent after the illegality has occurred." 
The Defendant claims that his incriminating statements were constitutionally tainted by 
police misconduct that occurred when he was illegally detained. In the present case, the statements 
were given at the time of the illegal detention, there was an absence of the presence of any 
intervening circumstances and the sole purpose of the illegal detention was to seize the property of 
the Defendant and obtain a confession. The officers actions in detaining the Defendant were 
improper and his statements were not voluntarily made and were tainted by the events that occurred 
during his detention. 
Based upon the unlawful seizure and detention of the Defendant the evidence ultimately 
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seized as well as the resulting statement of the Defendant should have been excluded by the trial 
court. 
Point m 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ALTERNATIVE (1) AND (2) OF 
THE AMENDED SECOND DEGREE MURDER INFORMATION AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE. 
The Defendant by Amended information was charged with a First Degree Felony of Murder 
pursuant to U.C.A. 76-5-203. The State plead in the alternative under Counts I (a) intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Ivan Moreno; (b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to Ivan 
Moreno committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Ivan Moreno; and 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death to Ivan Moreno and thereby caused the death of Ivan Moreno and 
used a dangerous weapon to wit: a firearm. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371 (Utah, 1966) in determining 
whether or not to allow the Defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty to Aggravated Murder addressed 
the distinction between the State being required to show that the actor intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of another or merely knew or reasonably should have known that his act would create 
a great risk of death to human life. 
The import of State v. Thurman. cited supra is to recognize that to convict a Defendant under 
U.C.A. 76-5-203(1) there must be a showing of intent to kill not depraved indifference and in this 
proceeding the trial court denied the motion declaring that the "Defendant did fire a weapon into a 
vehicle loaded with people, that he intentionally did that act".(Vol IITR 286). 
Defendant asserts the trial court did not apply a separate distinction to "intent" and "depraved 
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indifference" for culpability is a much broader concept in consideration of Defendant's mental state. 
Similarly, while addressing the crime of Attempted Depraved Indifference Homicide in State 
v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843 (Utah, 1992) the Utah Supreme Court indicated that culpability is a much 
broader concept than intent and ruled upon a very narrow issue stating as follows: 
We are asked to determine whether proof of the "knowing" mental state required for 
impraved indifference homicide under §76-5-203 (l)(c) of the Code is sufficient to 
satisfy the mental state required by Utah's Attempt Statute found in §76-4-101. If we 
find that the "knowing" mental state required for depraved indifference homicide is 
sufficient to satisfy the intent statute the State will be able to prosecute a Defendant for 
attempt to commit depraved indifference homicide. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Vigil indicated that intent is a mental state as opposed to 
culpability which refers to blameworthiness and is a much broader concept than intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Vigil cited supra, that to convict a Defendant on 
Attempted Second Degree Murder the prosecution must prove that the Defendant had a conscious 
objective or desire to cause the death of another and that because the mental state required for 
depraved indifference falls short of that intent the crime of Attempted Depraved Indifference 
Homicide does not exist in Utah. 
The rulings by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Vigil, cited supra, and State v. Thurman. 
cited supra, illustrates the difference between "intentionally or knowingly" and depraved indifference 
and the need for the prosecution when prosecuting in the alternative to make a showing of each 
separate alternative when they request a jury consider Murder under different alternatives.. 
The facts in the instant proceeding do not suggest that the Defendant had a conscious intent 
to murder anyone and in fact, the contrary is indicated where the Defendant was scared and fired a 
number of shots at the van in such frightened state. 
The State failed to establish that the Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
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Ivan Moreno in that the Defendant lacked the conscious objective to kill anyone and specifically 
lacked the conscious objective to kill Ivan Moreno for he did not even know Ivan Moreno or know 
who was in the back of the van chasing him. 
Similarly, of U.C.A. 76-5-203 (2) asserting that the Defendant intended to cause serious or 
bodily injury to Ivan Moreno is again an "intenf' allegation as opposed to a depraved indifference 
claim, which was not established by the State in its prosecution. 
Consequently, the trial court in the absence of evidence supporting alternatives 1 and 2 of the 
Murder information should have dismissed those alternatives leaving in place for jury consideration 
whether or not Defendant's actions evidenced a depraved indifference and caused the death of Ivan 
Moreno. 
As a direct result of the trial court's refusal to grant the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
alternatives (1) and (2) of the Second Degree Murder Information, the jury was given all three options 
for consideration and there is no way to ascertain how they arrived at their verdict in convicting the 
Defendant of Second Degree Murder and therefore Defendant should be granted a new trial. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED A SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION TO THE 
JURY OUTSIDE THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE THAT WAS NOT A 
CORRECT STATEMENT OF LAW AND WAS MISLEADING TO THE JURY. 
After the jury had been instructed and entered into its deliberations the jury submitted a 
question to the trial court (R. 231) which the court then answered confusing the issues. The trial court 
in its answer to the jury question began its response by declaring "if the court understands your 
question," and then failed to address instruction number 10 and 11 which formed the basis upon the 
which the jury could enter a conviction of Murder in the Second Degree or a lesser included offense. 
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Defendant asserts the Court's response to the jury question detracts from the totality of the jury 
instructions previously given and particularly detracts from instructions 10 and 11 which set forth the 
definitions for both intentionally and knowingly as well as depraved indifference. 
By its answer the Court ignores the need and responsibility of the jury to consider the elements 
of each offense in conjunction with the definitions given in instruction 10 and 11. Further, the jury 
asked if it could agree on one element of instruction number 9 when in fact there were at least two 
required elements under each alternative in instruction number 9. In essence the trial court obviated 
the need for the jury to consider all the elements under the different alternatives and allowed them to 
convict the Defendant without considering the definitions in instruction 10 and 11. There is no way 
of determining whether the jury fully understood and comprehended the confusing and misleading 
instruction given them by the 
The Court's instruction failed to advise the jury that all elements under any of the three 
alternatives had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt applying the definitions contained in 
instruction number 10 and 11 before a conviction could be entered by them. 
Consequently, the Defendant does not know which alternative(s) the jury may have used or 
if each of the eight jurors found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applying the law properly where the 
effect of the Court's supplemental instruction is confusion. 
While State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993) allows the Court to give supplemental 
instructions to the jury outside the presence of the Defendant it casts upon the trial judge the sole 
responsibility to accurately and adequately inform the jury of the law as it relates to the crime charged. 
The Court in conjunction with making the jury question and its response part of the record 
furnished counsel with a copy of State v. Powell indicating that it had used same in its rationale for 
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the supplemental instruction that had been given the jury. 
Had the Court advised the jury as provided in State v. Powell the confusion conveyed to the 
jury could have been avoided. Rather than ignoring the definition the court could have and should 
have advised the jury that a Defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner 
in which the crime was committed so long as there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt under each 
method, mode or manner charged. 
Unfortunately the supplemental instruction given by the trial court was misleading, confusing 
and/or an improper statement of the law and the Defendant asserts the confusion generated by the 
Court was of such a magnitude that Defendant's conviction of First Degree Murder should be reversed 
and he should be granted a new trial. 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE CONFUSING IF NOT 
MISLEADING SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION THAT WAS GIVEN TO 
THE JURY BY THE COURT IN ANSWER TO THE JURY'S QUESTION. 
The Defendant filed a Motion for a new trial contending that the Court should grant Defendant 
a new trial in the interest of justice there being an error and impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse affect upon the Defendant's rights. The Court after the hearing issued a ruling indicating that 
the Court did not foreclose the jury from asking further questions and that the Court felt that there was 
no need to give further explanation to instructions 10 and 11 since they were definitions and not 
elements. 
The Court overlooked both in giving the instruction initially and in denying Defendant's 
Motion for a new trial the jury's question "can we agree on one element on page 9?", the answer to 
such question is No. Before finding the Defendant guilty, all elements under any or all of the three 
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options must be found by each juror beyond a reasonable doubt and that concept and requirement was 
not properly conveyed to the jury and the trial court's failure to do so constitutes reversible error. 
The Defendant believes where the trial court was advised both immediately after the trial as 
well as during the hearing requesting a new trial that confusion t had been generated by the court's 
supplemental instruction to the jury, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge not to grant the 
Defendant a new trial. 
Defendant also asserts the jury by the Court's instruction could easily have believed it was no 
longer necessary to consider instructions 10 and 11 which define the elements that they had to 
consider in reaching a verdict. 
Again, the failure of the trial court to advise the jury that they needed to consider the 
definitions as such definitions related to the elements as well as all other instructions for the state also 
pursuant to the jury instructions given prior to deliberation, provided that the prosecution must also 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self defense pursuant to instruction 
number 15. (R. 208). 
Similarly, the Court failed to remind the jury that it must consider all the instructions together 
and not just the elements set forth in instruction number 9. 
Consequently, the Trial Court should have granted Defendant a new trial once its error and 
resulting prejudice had been demonstrated to the Court by the Defendant and to not do so constituted 
an abuse of discretion. 
Point VI 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF 
SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
The Defendant contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support a 
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Second Degree Murder conviction on U.C.A. 76-5-203 and specifically claims the evidence does not 
support the finding that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Ivan Moreno. Additionally 
and alternatively Defendant motioned to dismiss such alternative in the amended information at the 
conclusion of the prosecution's case recognizing that a jury conviction is reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence viewed is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. 
Defendant contends a jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was his conscious 
objective or desire (actual intent) to cause the victims death or that he intended (actual intent)to 
cause serious bodily injury and in so doing committed an act clearly dangerous causing the death 
of Ivan Moreno. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah,1989) set for the standard 
for insufficiency of the evidence which has been acknowledged hereinabove by the Defendant. Also 
State v.Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555 (Utah, 1985). The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 
1027 (Utah, 1994) indicated State v. Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah, 1987) was controlling and that 
the right to a unanimous jury verdict did not include a right to a unanimous decision as to the 
particular alternative under the single crime of Second Degree Murder. 
The difficulty presenting in the instant proceeding is that the Defendant motioned to dismiss 
certain alternatives (1) and (2) under the Second Degree Murder Statute which the Court denied and 
while there may be evidence supporting alternative (3) of the amended second degree murder 
information, there is no way of knowing how the jury arrived at its verdict where those three 
alternatives were available for their consideration. 
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Consequently, the court should consider whether or not the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial as to each alternative of the amended information submitted to the jury and in so doing 
Defendant contends the evidence is so lacking as to the first two alternatives of the amended 
information.. 
The Defendant asserts that because a unanimous jury verdict is required and there is not 
substantial evidence under each of the three (3) methods, modes or manners charged such 
insufficiency should result in awarding Defendant a new trial. This assertion is supported in State v. 
Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah, 1987) where the Court recognized the need for substantial evidence to 
support each method, mode or manner charged to sustain a conviction. 
Defendant further asserts under the particular circumstances and evidence produced at this trial 
the evidence illustrates the acts of the Defendants were reckless as opposed to depraved and as such 
are more consistent with the charge of Manslaughter rather than Murder in the First Degree. 
The Defendant asserts he should be entitled to a new trial if not by virtue of each of the 
foregoing assignments of error but the cumulative and substantial effect of all such errors. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing argument the Defendant, Enrique Coria requests this 
court grant Defendant a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/_|; day of MarcJv^CKK^ 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the 
PlaintifFRespondent's attorney, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Attorney for Respondent, 236 
State Capitol BuUding, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on tins /^daTPfMarch, 2000. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Amended Information 
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Count 
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Attorney No 98-0175F 
District No 981900386 
O.T.N. 8113896 
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ih day of January, 1998 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
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ID DEFENDANT 
1) INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSED THE DEATH OF 
MORENO AND/O^ 
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APPENDIX MB" 
Juror Gorder Voir Dire 
wnc we s : 
a^ vveoer ^ : ; ie iv:cves i s 
i i i v e b . i U a L U i Dave waKeneia i s a coss io le witness 
.i~ AU:;,i lao . a Mr. james 
10 Carroll that we may call as a 'witness: 
'v_u;^n - : 
.a, wouiG vcu turn so tnev can 
IS lese persons that have been named? If so, raise vour hand. 
i / o o v_i.^ .
 w —: 
j_ ricrriL. . v\e • _L_L s_ar" re on tne wouia 
you, sir, in the gray, stand or just stay there and tell us 
z u wno VOL wna t ' s 
ivr; bcrcer 
9? THE COURT: Okay. Kelly Gorder. Lee! o o zz zz o o H - V ^ 
ZD Number one is on the right, for those of you who are 
looKing nere. 
i 
All right. Mr. Gorder, with whom are you acquainted of I 
i 
those that were named? i 
. GORDER: i Know 
THE COURT: And h a s Mr. F a i r r e p r e s e n t e d y o u i n am 
i t t e r s ? 
MR. GORDER: Y e s , h e h a s . 
THE COURT: So he is your attorney then? 
MR. GORDER: Yes. 
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Now, given than legal principle, if a defendant does 
not testify, under the law you cannot sit as a juror if you 
are going uo come up with any concept in your mind that, 
Now, do any of you have any problems with that concept 
of our judicial system and this case? If you do, raise your 
hand 
(No response) 
THE*C0UR7: Ail right. Now you may proceed. 
MR. PERKINS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The next question I'd ask of the panel is, other than 
Mr. -- Mrs. Cummings, who we know is related to a police 
62 
officer or former police officer and bailiff, do any of the 
rest of vou have anv other relatives or friends close 
friends, that are in law enforcement? Okay. Let's start 
with Mr. Gorder? 
MR. GORDER: Yes, sir. 
MR. PERKINS: Could you tell us about that, who it 
is and the relationship? 
MR. GOPJDER: I know quite a few officers, mostly 
Weber County: Mike Birch, John Meadows, John Rodenbough, 
quite a few of them. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. Now, these officers that you 
that? 
MR. GORDER: I talk to Mike quite a bit. He's my 
landlord. Just as friends, we hunt and everything together. 
And then just kind of like I guess Steve Earr, I deer hunt 
with him so -- not that that -- I've never talked about any 
cases with him. 
MR. PERKINS: Speaking of Steve Earr, is he 
representing you on anything right now? 
MR. GORDER: Not right now. We already went to 
court. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. Would your relationship with 
anv of these oolice officers or talking somewhat to some of 
them about that, would that affect your ability in any way 
to hear this case and 
r/P 
:;a vt 
nave a cousin tnat•s a police j 
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- a i c b ex . i ^  i 
nos iiKe una: wicn 
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MS. STAGEY: Stacey. Jana Scacey. My husband's 
really good friend from high school is a police officer for 
West: Valley. His name is Justin Hoyle . 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. As far as you, do you - - d o 
you have chat same tvoe of friendship and talk cases with --
MS. STAGEY: We've heard a couple of cases and 
»Ou-LU . . ; G . / c* — C +~- . 
MS. STAGE1 
MS . STAC] 
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MR. GORDSR: Yes, there have been two. 
THE COURT: And whan time frame has he rep: 
you? 
MR. GORDER: The last one was inst like ore 
innr n it ago. 
THE COURT: And prior no thai how long? 
MR. CORDER: It's been a few years ago. 
THE COURT: I see. And were these criminal 
offenses? 
MR. GORDER: No. 
THE COURT: Were obey --
MR. GORDER: One was -- one was a DUI, and "he 
other was -- I was involved in a car wreck. 
THE COURT: Did you get a citation or something 
that was disputed or --
MR. GORDER: Yeah. The first one I was a witness; 
the second one was I actually got a DUI. 
THE COURT: I see. And when was that? 
MR. GORDER: November of last year, and we just 
went to court. 
THE COURT: And then it was just resolved recently? 
MRp.' GORDER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. Was there a trial in the 
matter? 
MR. GORDER: Yes. It was in Sunset, Judge 
"1 A 
i hi 
Sandberg. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And that's beer, very 
recenu ihen. 
MR. GORDSR: Yes. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. And let me ask you this, if 
you had any legal issues thai came up of any nature, would 
he be the attorney that ycu would first consult? 
MR. GORDER: More than likely, yes. 
THE COURT: All right:. Thank you. 
Now, Ms. Couch? 
MS. COUCH: Uh-huh. 
THE 10TRT: The issue of the inconvenience chat yTou 
might suffer is of some concern :o the Court, of course, but 
-- ic :s a maramai reason for not beinq 
requirec ^o remain nere anc — anc serve. i! you were ~o 
serve on the jury and be required to be here- on -- on 
Friday, as well as today and tomorrow, would you be able to j 
make other arrangements for these kids to get down 
MS. COUCH: I would -- I would try to. I 
other mothers wouldn't be able to. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS*"COUCH: But I would have to see if my 
could or -- I could try to. 
THE COURT: Where does your husband work? 
j MS. COUCH: He works for Morrell and Sons 
there? 
know the 
husband 
Heating 
APPENDIX " C 
Juror Couch Voir Dire 
D l 
MR. PARMLEY: Thank you. 
Let me just ask you a follow-up question 
1 about the rodeo Friday. Yes, there you are. 
I us again the circumstances of this? 
MS. COUCH: It's a high school rodeo 
Friday morning at 9:00. It's in Salina, so it 
i three-hour drive. I'm taking two other girls 
daughter because their mothers -- one of them 
1 and the other one's father is going through ci 
J So they're asking me to take them, too, so it 
Ms. Couch, ! 
Will you tell 
and it starts 
: 's like a 
besides my 
has a wedding 
lemotherapy. 
's just not my 
all day.Friday and all day Saturday. We planned en leaving 
about 3:00 on Thursday afternoon, but I can, you know, if 
morning. 
MR. PARMLEY: Do you feel if you were required to 
stay behind to hear the trial-that the fact that they're 
making other arrangements to go to Salina would interfere 
with your abilities to attend to the trial and be a fair and 
impartial jury? 
MS. COUCH: I mean, I would try to, but it's just I 
feel like I \m probably preoccupied with a lot of involvement 
in things at home, getting ready, things like that. 
MR. PARMLEY: Okay. When I asked earlier if any of 
you had any ideology or philosophy that would make it 
difficult to sic in judgment of another person, I didn't see 
any hands. Are you comfortable with that, Ms. Couch? 
MS. COUCH: I mean, I've never thought of it 
.oeiore, anc even coming to tnis jury cuty i never tncugn^, 
about, you know, that it would be a murder situation. But I 
don't -- it's like I don't feel like I have any kind of 
philosophy against judging people or anything, but I think 
it's a big responsibility and it'd be hard. 
MR. PARM1EY: Do you feel that if evidence proved 
that somebody is guilty of a serious crime like that, that 
as a juror you would be able to do your duty ana f m a a 
oe r s on cu i 11 v ? 
MS. COUCH: Yes. 
MR. PARM1EY: Okay. Well, we've talked about a lot 
of things and we appreciate the help that you've given us by 
answering questions. We all have our own life experiences 
and things that make us who we are and make us feel the way 
we do and give us cur -- our prejudices and a lot of times 
those things are pretty firmly set. 
What we're asking you to do is to lock at yourself and 
if there's anything that you think would make it hard for 
you to b^-a juror and to sit in judgment in a murder case, 
if there's anything that would give ycu a bias or something 
that you think would be unfair in the case, that you talk 
about that and let us know because the paramount concern 
:o hear this case and be an impartial juror? 
MR. GQRDER: No, not chat I would u» )V.' . 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. Okay. Mrs. Couch, did you 
have your hand up, also? 
MS. COUCK: Yes. I have a cousin chat's a police 
officer for South Ogden, I think. Randy Orewiec. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. And do you discuss cases and 
things like that with him? 
MS. COUCH: Somecimes he cells us chings that's 
happened and that, but not a lot. 
MR. PERKINS: Would thac affect your ability co be 
MS. COUCK: (Shakes head from side to side.) 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. Was there anyone else on che 
fronc row? Mrs. Barton, is ic? 
MS. STACEY: Stacey. Jana Stacey. My husband's 
really good friend from high school is a police officer for 
Wesc Valley. Kis name is Justin Hoyle. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. As far as you, do you --do 
you have chat same type of friendship and talk cases with -• 
MS. STACEY: We've heard a couple of cases and 
scuff. 
MR. PERKINS: Would cnac affecc your abilicy co oe 
a juror in any way? 
MS. STACEY: No. 
7 £ 
Sandberg. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
recent then. 
MR. GORDER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. And let me ask you this, if 
you had any legal issues that came up of any nature, would 
he be the attorney that you would first consult? 
MR. GORDER: More than likely, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Now, Ms. Couch? 
MS. COUCH: Uh-huh. 
might suffer is of some concern to the Court, 
legally it's -- it's a marginal reason for not being 
required to remain here and -- and serve. If you were to 
serve on the jury and be required to be here on -- on 
Friday, as well as today and tomorrow, would you be able to 
make other arrangements for these kids to get down there? 
MS. COUCH: I would -- I would try to. I know the 
other mothers wouldn't be able to. 
THE COURT: Right. 
M6. COUCH: But I would have to see if my husband 
could or - - I could try to. 
THE COURT: Where does your husband work? 
MS. COUCH: He works for Morrell and Sons Heating 
/b 
and Air-Conditioning. 
MS. COUCH: Yes, I work for the IRS. 
THE COURT: Oh, yes. I remember now you said that. I 
All right. And it's your daughter and two other young 
ladies chat you'd be' taking down? 
MS. COUCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Would you be hauling horses down? 
"~ - ... ~~. j 
THE COURT: So you would be drivinc the truck and j 
pulling the nailer with the horses? j 
MS. COUCH: Uh-huh, yes. 
THE COURT: And what type of a competition -- other 
than a high school rodeo, whan type competition specifically j 
are they in? | 
MS. COUCH: They -- my daughter, she rides her j 
horse in a barrel competition, poles, and she ropes and j 
then -- is that what you mean? It's an all-day event. A I 
full rodeo#with all high school kids participating against ! 
each other around the state. 
THE COURT: And the other two girls that you've j 
committed to take down? 
76 
MS. COUCH: They -- -he one gal does three events, 
and the other one does all four events, also. 
THE COUR.T : 1 see . 
MS. COUCH: It's something they go to compete all 
year long for state finals and the national finals. 
THE COURT: So they get points and as they earn the 
points then they move on to further -- more competition; is 
that correct? 
MS. COUCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: How long have you had this in your 
"^  1 a ^ s ^  
what rodeos that we're going to go to in, let's see, July, 
when we first got, you know, they got their schedule. And 
it's August 16th when we entered 
entry fees. And then it's been the plan that * I would take 
the three girls for about two v/eeks. 
THE COURT: There are monetary fees that are 
paid --
MS. COUCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- to enter these events then? 
o£S . COUCH: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you've been the committed person 
since about July to go to this rodeo? 
MS. COUCH: Yeah. I've been committed to take my 
77 
.c least, and then in the last couple of weeks 
z/^ 'v*0 iou^d cut than her f r c e r. c s neeo.ed to rice, tec s' 
committed to cake tnem cwc weeKs ace. 
TVTT ^^~^~P • ZA^H V , V O ^ C 4 Q '-^"v ^ ~ , - ~"^ - ^ ^ 9 
MS. COUCH: .^ c-ec 
THE COURT: So she does not drive. 
MS. COUCH: All of then are 15. 
THE COURT: i see. All right. Will counsel then 
reapproach cne bench? 
You jurors are probably getting tired of ail this 
jumping up and down, but we have to do in. 
THE COURT: The process now chat -we are engaging in 
I 
is wnac we call the peremptory challenge stage of the jury | 
selection. The attorneys for no cause, no reason other than 
their own desires, are entitled to strike a certain number 
of jurors and then that will leave us with the panel that 
will actually hear the case. And that's the stage that we 
are in now. We're getting close. As soon as we're done 
with this, we will empanel the jury that is selected and 
then creak for lunch and come back after a lunch break to 
begin the case. 
Z might just say that I hope all of you have the 
opportunity at some time to sit as jurors. You are the 
backbone of our system. In this country juries are much 
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APPENDIX "E" 
Statement of Defendant 
OGDEN CITY POLICE 
STATEMENT 
OFFENSE: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CASE #98-719 
STATEMENT OF: ENRIQUE CORIA Jr. 
10/14/75 
3160 No. 2575 W., FARRWEST UTAH 84404 
731-8068 
I, ENRIQUE CORIA Jr., do give this statement to Detective LEDFORD of the Ogden City 
Police Department of my own free will. 
I understand that I have the right to remain silent, that anything I say can and will be used against 
me in court; that if at anytime during this statement and questioning I decide to stop taiking, I 
may do so. I understand I have the right to talk to an attorney and have an attorney with me 
during this statement and questioning. If I cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for 
me free of charge. Having the above rights in mind, I voluntarily give the following statement: 
I PULLED INTO THE GAS STATION. I WAS GOING TO PUT SOME GAS IN, THEN I 
SEEN THEM COMING. I PULLED IN AND THEY CAME IN. THEY GOT RIGHT IN 
FRONT OF ME. AFTER THAT THEY STARTED LOOKING AT ME, MAD DOGGING ME. 
THEY WERE THROWING UP 18, SO I FLIPPED THEM OFF. THEY GOT IN MY WAY SO 
I COULDN'T GET OUT. THEY STARTED MOVING SLOW, THEN I GOT OUT. 
ANOTHER CAR CAME IN. THEY GOT OUT AND STARTED THROWING 18. I GOT 
ONTO THE BLVD AND GOT ONTO 30TH ST. THEY STARTED CHASING AFTER ME, 
WALKING. I HEARD WHAT I THOUGHT WERE TWO SHOTS, THEN I POINTED THE 
GUN AT THEM. THEN I TOOK OFF. I WENT AROUND THE BLOCK AND THEY 
FOUND ME. THEY STARTED CHASING AFTER ME. THEY WERE THROWING 
BOTTLES AND STUFF. DROVE ALL THE WAY TO 20TH TURNED DOWN 20TH WENT 
ON WALL. WENT SOUTH DROVE ALL THE WAY TO 22ND. I TURNED OFF, I 
STARTED SHOOTING AT THEM. THEY TOOK OFF IIP 23RD. THAT'S THE LAST TIME 
I SEEN THEM. I TOOK OFF AND DROPPED THAT KID OFF AND WENT HOME, 
THAT'S IT. 
Q: WHEN YOU WERE AT THE KICKS 66 GAS STATION, WHAT STARTED THE 
CONFRONTATION? 
A: I DONT KNOW, I PROBABLY LOOKED AT THEM WRONG. PROBABLY THOUGHT 
THAT I CUT THEM OFF, THEY WERE JUST PUNKS AND THEY WANTED SOME 
TROUBLE. 
Q: WHEN YOU LEFT THE KICKS 66 GAS STATION, DID YOU WAIT FOR THEM TO 
LEAVE ALSO? 
A: NO, I TOOK OFF. I SLOWED DOWN, ABOUT 20 MPH, I DIDN'T WANT THEM TO 
RUSH. I DIDN'T WANT ANY TROUBLE. 
Q: WHICH GUN DID YOU POINT AT THEM AT THE KICKS 669 
A: .380 DAVIS 
Q: WHERE IS THAT GUN NOW? 
A: THE POLICE HAVE IT. 
Q: AFTER THE CHASE, AND YOU PULLED ONTO 22ND ST.. WHAT WAS GOING 
THROUGH YOUR MIND? 
A: I WAS SCARED, IF THEY CAUGHT UP TO ME, THEY PROBABLY WOULD OF BEAT 
ME UP, BAD. 
Q: YOU WERE SCARED, SO YOU STARTED SHOOTING AT THEM? 
A: YEAH. 
Q: AT ANY TIME DURING THIS CHASE, DID THE PEOPLE IN THE VAN SHOOT AT 
YOU'? 
A: NO. 
Q: AT ANY TIME DURING THE CHASE, OR AT THE CONFRONTATION AT THE GAS 
STATION, DID YOU SEE A GUN? 
A: NO. 
Q: THE ONLY THING YOU HEARD THEN WERE WHAT YOU THOUGHT TWO 
GUNSHOTS AT THE KICKS 66 GAS STATION? 
A: YEAH. 
Q: WHAT GUN DID YOU SHOOT AT THE VAN WITH? 
A: .40 SMITH AND WESSON. 
Q: WHERE IS THE GUN AT NOW? 
A: I DONT KNOW, THE COPS GOT IT SOMEWHERE. 
Q: HOW MANY SHOTS DID YOU FIRE AT THE VAN? 
A: PROBABLY NINE AND ONE IN THE AIR. 
Q: WHY WERE YOU SHOOTING AT THE VAN? 
A: SCARED, I THOUGHT THEY HAD A GUN. 
Q: WHEN YOU WERE SHOOTING AT THE VAN, DID YOU THINK SOMEONE MIGHT 
GET SHOT? 
A: NO, I DIDN'T MEAN TO DO IT. 
Q: HOW DO YOU FEEL KNOWING THAT SOMEONE WAS SHOT AND DIED0 
A: I FEEL BAD. LM SORRY. 
Q: AT ANY POINT, WERE YOU BEHIND THE VAN? 
A: NO, NEVER. 
Q: AT ANY POINT, DID YOU SHOOT AT THE VAN, PRIOR TO YOU STOPPING ON 
22ND9 
A: NO. 
Q: AT ANY POINT. WERE YOU CHASING THE VAN? 
A: NO. I WAS NEVER CHASING, THEY WERE CHASING ME. 
Q: WHEN I APPROACHED YOU AT YOUR TRUCK. WHAT DID I SAY TO YOU? 
A: YOU SAID THAT YOU WANTED TO TALK TO ME, THAT I WASN'T UNDER 
ARREST AND THAT I WAS FREE TO LEAVE. 
Q: AFTER THAT, HOW MANY TIMES DID I TELL YOU THAT YOU COULD WALK 
OUT THE DOOR AND NOT TALK TO ME0 
A: PROBABLY ABOUT FOUR, YOU SAID IT A LOT OF TIMES. 
Q: EVEN THOUGH YOU WEREN'T UNDER ARREST AND I TOLD YOU THAT YOU 
COULD LEAVE, I STILL ADVISED YOU OF YOUR RIGHTS. CORRECT? 
A: YEP. 
Q: WHY DID I TELL YOU THAT I DID THAT? 
A: TO PROTECT ME. 
Q: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT? 
A: NO, NOTHING TO SAY. 
I have read the above statement and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Witness / Slgnatiye ^ 
Typed by Detective Ledford on 01/24/98 at 0236 his. 
APPENDIX "F" 
Jury Instruction 9-11 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Before you can convict the deiendant of the crime of MURDER, a first degree 
felony, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
a) That the said defendant, Enrique Coria, Jr., intentionally or knowingly, 
b) caused the death of I % s -1J Moreno, 
and/or 
a) said defendant intending to cause serious bodily injury to Ivan 
Moreno, 
b) committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the 
death of Ivan Moreno, 
and or 
a) said defendant, acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, 
b) engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to Ivan 
Moreno, 
c) and thereby caused the death of Ivan Moreno. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential elements 
of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant of 
MURDER, a first degree felony. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish 
one or more of said elements, you should not find the Defendant guilty of Murder. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _10__ 
Before you can fmd the Defendant was, "acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life'*, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt the 
following: 
1) That the defendant acred knowingly 
2) hi creating a grave risk of death 
3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave 
4) which means a highly likely probability of death, 
and 
5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference toward human life 
203 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, wrhen it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumsi^iicj^ surrounding his conduct 
or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result 
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APPENDIX "H" 
Court Supplemental Jury Instruction 
If the court understands your question, the answer is that you might disagree on the basis 
tbr convicting, so long as each of you is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the State has met 
it's burden under one of the three grounds for convicting, as set forth in Instruction 9. There 
must, however, still be a unanimous decision of Guilt before convicting under Instruction 9. 
APPENDIX "F 
Courts Memorandum to Council 
STATE V CORIA Case 981900386 FS MEMORANDUM 
In this case the court was notified at about 1:30 pm, about 2 hours after the jury entered 
the jury room, that the jury had a question for the court which they submitted in wntmg. The 
court returned to it's chambers shortly thereafter and reviewed the memo from the jury. 
It read: 
"On the charge of Murder, a first degree felony. Must there be a unanimous 
agreement on each individual element of instructions 9, 10 and 11, or can we 
agree on one element on page 9?" 
The court made inquiry as to whether or not the attorneys were in the building and was 
informed they were not. 
The court drafted a response at 1:45 pm for the jury which read: 
"If the court understands your question, the answer is that you might 
disagree on the basis for convicting, so long as each of you is convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt the State has met it's burden under one of the three grounds 
for convicting, as set forth in instruction 9. There must, however, still be a 
unanimous decision of Guilt before convicting under Instruction 9." 
This response was made by the court pursuant to State v. Russell, 733 P. 2d 162 (1987) as 
affirmed by State v Powell 872 P.2d 1027 (1994). Instructions 10 and 1 i were definitions of 
"depraved indifference to human life" and 'intentionally" and "knowingly", as said terms are 
used in Instruction 9 and the only reasonable interpretation of the jury question was as responded 
to by the court. There were no additional questions by the jury. 
The court notes that this same issue was raised by the defense in a bench conference and 
rejected by the court after closing argument but before the jury began deliberations and was 
funher addressed on the record after the jury left the courtroom, as the defense had requested a 
'curative' instruction regarding some comments made by the prosecutor in final argument 
regarding the jury's options in considering Instruction 9. The court felt the issue had also 
previously been alluded to by the parties and the court dunng lengthy jury instruction 
conferences, both on and off the record. 
Dated t+tfs^d day of October 1998. 
Roger S. Dutson, Judge x -
The court directs the clerk mail a copy of this memorandum to all attorneys of record. 
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fne defendant na^ moved ivab coun lor a nevv ;nai pur^uaia 10 uxvuir' iNiae -4 i:\^ moaon 
is based on the claim that the court gave the Jury an erroneous instruction while they were in 
deliberations after they had requested clarification of the Court's instructions. 
The court gave the following instructions, numbered 9, 10 & 11. 
INSTRUCTION NO __9_ 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of MURDER, a first degree felony, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime 
a) That the said defendant, Enrique Coria, Jr , intentionally or knowingly, 
b) caused the death of Ivan Moreno, 
and/or 
a) said defendant, intending to cause serious bodily injury to Ivan Moreno, 
b) committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Ivan Moreno, 
and/or 
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a) said defendant, acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, 
b) engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to Ivan Moreno, 
c) and thereby caused the death of I :^\:'-f -reno. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential elements of this offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant of MURDER, a first degree 
felony. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements, you 
snouid not find the Defendant guilty of Murder. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Before you can find the Defendant was, ;iacting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life77, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt the following: 
1) That the defendant acted knowingly 
2) in creating a grave risk of death 
3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave 
4) which means a highly likely probability of death, 
and 
5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and indifference toward human life 
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INSTRUCTION NO 11 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
knowingly; or with knowledge, with respect to a 
re^Uii oi iub conduct vvncn ne is aware mai nib 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
The Jury asked the court the following question: 
"On the charge of Murder, a first degree felony. Must there be a unanimous agreement on 
each individual element Of instructions 9, 10, and 11, or can we agree on one element on page 9?" 
The court's responding instruction was as follows: 
"If the court understands your question, the answer is that you might disagree on the basis 
for convicting, so long as each of you is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the State has met it's 
burden under one of the three grounds for convincing, as set fonh in Instruction 9. There must, 
however, still be a unanimous decision of Guilt before convicting; under Instruction 9 " 
The defendant asserts the above Instruction was a " misleading statement of the law" and that 
it ''did not accurately and adequately inform the jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged " 
They support this claim arguing the court was erroneous by not include an explanation of instructions 
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10 and 11 and by only mentioning instruction 9 in its response to the jury question. 
Instruction Number 9 set forth the elements of the offense. It clearly set forth the basic 
elements of the crime charged and was accepted by the panies as a proper instruction prior to jury 
deliberations. Instructions 10 was a definition of ''acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life77 and Instruction 11 defined "intentionally, or with intent or willfully77 and 
"knowingly \ The question from the Jury room was whether or not they all had to agree on "each77 
element of instructions 9, 10 & 11 or could they agree on "one element" of instruction 9. 
The court did not foreclose the jury from asking further questions by using the language "If 
the court understands your question, . . . and then proceeded to give the jury a brief clarifying 
instruction regarding what the court understood their question to address. No further questions were 
asked by the jury and they shortly returned with their verdict. The court felt there was no need to 
give further explanation of Instructions 10 and 11 as they were "definitions77 and not "elements" and 
therefore the court response was oniy to the issue of addressing the concept of "elements" which was 
the crux of the jury's question. Additionally, the court believes its instructions and the clarifying 
instructions were consistent with the law and with the principles set forth in State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 
162 (1987) and Stare v. Powell 872 P.2d 1027 (1994). 
The court had already been alerted to the concerns of counsel for Defendant during a bench 
conference and had ruled on the issue informally, before jury deliberations. Because of these facts 
the court issued a memorandum setting forth the facts and court rationale immediately after trial, to 
be included in the record, and a copy was issued to counsel. 
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Therefore, the coun hereby rules that Defendant is not entitled to a new trial pursuant to the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24. The coun believes its instructions were proper and the jury-
was not confused about the instructions and that the coun properly explained the law to the jury. 
There was no issue of error or impropriety which would have had a substantial adverse effect on the 
rights of the Defendant. 
DATED this 3> day of March, 1999. 
ROGEP/S. DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to the 
following parties by first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 3?-d day of March, 1999: 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBE3. COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ENRIQUE CORIA, 
Defendant. 
/ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ase iNo. yfa o i ju^i 
Judge: Roger S. Dutson 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant and Appellant, Enrique Cona 
Jr., through his attorneys, RONALD W. PERKINS and KEVTN P. SULLIVAN hereby 
appeals to the Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable Rogsr S. Dutson 
denying Defendant's Motion for a New trial entered in this matter on March 3, 1999. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this / day of April, 1999. 
'j/)/*^/*? GJ'/t 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
KEVTN P. SULLIVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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